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International Society: Cosmopolitan Politics and World Society 
Kimberly Weaver 
Abstract 
 
How does the international system move from an anarchic system driven by 
power to a global community driven by the needs/wants of the community at large?  
Jürgen Habermas utilizes the tenets of his Communicative Action Theory to underline the 
importance of communicatively based repertoire in the international system between and 
among states and non-state actors and the citizens themselves. How does arguing and 
reasoning among states and international institutions bring together legitimization and 
order?  My research aims to analyze the movement of the international system from 
anarchy towards a global civil society.  In doing so, I will examine Communicative 
Action Theory in International Relations, in particular the development of legitimization 
processes in international politics, the role of state sovereignty and its effect on the 
legitimization process of non-state actors.  I argue that underdeveloped legitimization 
processes at the international level consist of fragile consensus building mechanisms that 
explain why disagreement can and often does lead to violence.  However, I also contend 
that the international system is moving toward a more developed global civil society.   
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Introduction 
 
Throughout this thesis I aim to show that communicative action theory best explains the 
development and, in some cases, underdevelopment of global civil society norms and 
institutions.  Two central questions structure my analysis: (1) How does Habermasian-
based IR theory help us to understand international problems regarding order and 
stability?  (2) What evidence is there that communicative action based repertoire can 
move us beyond the anarchic international system to one a of global public sphere. 
 
In this thesis, I begin by first examining the basic tenets of Communicative Action 
Theory; Lifeworld, legitimacy, validity claims (sincerity, rightness, truth), and speech 
acts.  In doing so, I will show that by instilling communicative action into the 
international system there will be greater room for argumentation among state and non-
state actors.  I then move on to examine the relationship between legitimization and 
order.  I argue that by creating a space for all actors to communicate in a reasonable and 
rational way, the international system can become more responsive to the central issues 
facing all global citizens. 
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So, why is it important to assess the relationship between legitimization and order? 
Moreover, how should we, as political scientists, examine the relationship between those 
that hold legitimate power and how order is created and maintained? Legitimization is the 
process by which state and non-state actors learn to reason out their differences and to 
live by what Habermas referred to as the force of the better argument in the international 
system.   Through such processes, actors deliberate upon the most reasonable courses of 
action for instituting democratic norms.  Learning to live by the force of the better 
argument is crucial since it allows us to understand why actors adopt new norms and 
rules to resolve problems, both on the local and global level. Reasoned argumentation 
and moral persuasion, in this sense, are communicative aspects that legitimize the 
actions, rules and principles of international institutions. 
 
The evolution of the concept of legitimacy, it could be argued, encompasses the rise of 
the modern states system and social sciences. The modern social sciences, for instance, 
emerged out of the Enlightenment.  The aim of the Enlightenment was to challenge 
societies' reliance on myths and religion and to understand the material properties of 
human society.  Here the idea was that, through scientific and philosophical study, we 
could discover and recognize legitimate sources of government, that is, how government 
justified its public right to rule.  A diverse range of thinkers, including Michel Foucault, 
Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas have  focused on the problem of legitimacy and the 
discursive contexts of social action.  Despite their differences, these scholars believe that 
there were elements of the Enlightenment that modern social science has abandoned, 
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such as the inclusion of the public sphere, critical questioning, and human reason.  The 
abandonment of the Enlightenment principles, in this manner, thus begged the question: 
how should we live our lives? 
 
Legitimacy has also helped to shape normative international relations theory, by focusing 
on the role of international institutions (law and diplomacy) in furthering peace and 
negotiations.  International relations (IR), it should be noted, derives from a long tradition 
of  analyzing  societies of states, a family of nations and an international community. 
After World War II, the major state powers established the first international relations 
discipline at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth in order “to discover the causes of the 
First World War so that future generations might be spared a similar catastrophe.”1  The 
social analyses of this school would help establish the basis for critical studies in IR and 
the emergence of critical international theory in the 1980s, which focused more attention 
on normative issues such as identity and ethics. 
 
Critical international theory emerged from the third debate in International Relations in 
the 1980s.
2
  Within the third debate, critical theorists argued that realism's scientific focus 
on anarchy and state power had excluded alternative social theories that stressed the 
importance of social change and ethics.  The first debate, for instance, pitted Realism 
against Liberalism, while the second debate focused on Behavioralism and 
Traditionalism.  Unlike the first debate, the second debate focused on empirical methods; 
quantifying data; “a rigorous demand for facts-through-observation.”3  The third debate, 
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then, was essentially about the post-positivists‟ (or those who rejected scientific, causal 
methods to study social phenomena) insistence that we ask how we know what we know, 
why we know what we know, and do we really know what we think we know.  The post-
positivists of the third debate, according to Yale H. Ferguson “rejected strict science and 
emphasized the subjective and normative dimensions of knowledge.”4  Ferguson argues, 
“the scientific tradition was arguably harmful to theory construction because it confused 
positivism with theory, thereby conflating theory and method.”5  Furthermore, it was 
argued that the third debate revealed the movement away from empiricism toward 
normative and subjective ideas. A critical analysis of the third debate presents a new way 
for political science scholars to view and study International Relations. 
 
Robert W. Cox discusses the different purposes of theory, problem-solving theory and 
critical theory.  Whereas other theories, such as Realism, reflect a theory of problem-
solving (just giving the already existing system a encompassing structure to be 
understood), critical theory “asks how that order come about.”6  Critical theory takes the 
next step in examining historical circumstances of social change, and then applies the 
findings to what can be done to promote/encourage progressive change. When looking at 
general theories of political science, Kristen Renwick Monroe argues that, “although the 
regularities in human behavior are sufficient to justify a search for patterns that can be 
developed into theories of political life, it is more difficult to argue that such theories can 
be universal in nature.”7  
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 It is important to stress that critical IR is not state-centric, but rather attempts to go 
beyond this limitation.  Randall D. Germain asserts that in looking at critical theory 
historically, “the Gramscian turn in IR thus provides a way to conceptualize world order 
free of the constraints of state-centric approaches and the interstate relations they focus 
upon, without abandoning altogether an explicit acknowledgement of their importance.”8  
This is not to say that the importance of the state and its dynamic role in development is 
inconsequential, rather the state has and will play a continued role in the realm of global 
politics.  In these terms, the state is one of many actors involved in the international 
system, and though it plays a decisive role, it is not the only actor, as proponents of 
realism would assert.  Nevertheless, we must recognize that foreign policy making relies 
heavily on the assumptions of realism and state centricity. Given that “legitimacy is 
rooted in rational deliberation,” it is important to determine how state power informs our 
critical analyses of deliberation and negotiating in international politics.
9
  My central aim, 
then, in this thesis, is twofold: (1) to focus on the influence of Jurgen Habermas's theory 
in IR; and (2) to analyze the problematic (and possibly constructive) role of state power 
in legitimizing international rules, authority, and order.  
 
Literature Review 
There are two schools of Habermasian-based approaches that I will explore.  The first has 
adapted Habermas to international politics by demonstrating how his theory allows us to 
understand and explain the role of reasoned argumentation in international institutions 
and decision-making.  I will examine the works of Thomas Risse, Harald Muller and 
Jennifer Mitzen.  The second school has adapted Habermas into a globalist perspective 
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with a cosmopolitan focus aimed at rethinking citizenship and the global system as a 
whole.  For the analysis, I will examine the works of Andrew Linklater and the English 
School. 
Reasoned Argumentation 
Risse, Mitzen and Muller have each contributed to the research of international 
institutions within international relations studies.  Thomas Risse examines argumentation 
between the two extremes of utility maximizing action and rule-guided behavior.
10
   He 
“claim that Jürgen Habermas‟s critical theory of communicative action is helpful in 
conceptualizing the logic of arguing and can actually be brought to bear to tackle 
empirical questions in world politics.”11  Risse argues that between the “logic of 
consequentialism” or a rational choice perspective and the “logic of appropriateness” or 
the rule follower, lies the “logic of arguing”.12  (See Figure 1)  By doing so, Risse shows 
that between these two extremes lies a space where each meet and communicative action 
can be formed.  In the „logic of arguing‟ we find that, as Habermas states, “…the action 
orientations of the participating actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculation of 
success, but through the acts of understanding.”13  This point is key, for rather than 
arguing for the point of being successful in changing other minds, you argue for the sake 
of reasoned analysis.  In order to accomplish this argumentation, Risse argues that 
international institutions are needed to facilitate communication among and between 
actors.  International institutions can help to create and enhance common lifeworlds 
among actors and work to minimize power differentials. 
 
7 
 
Figure 1. Three Logics of Social Action
14
 
 
    Reasoned Analysis 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Rational Choice Actors:     Rule Followers 
Utility Maximizers      “Do the right thing” 
 
Interpreting Habermas, Mitzen examines communicative action theory encompassed in a 
state of anarchy.  She argues that even in the unstable international order, communicative 
action can reduce the presence of violence in the international system and can help to 
facilitate ways around the security dilemma.
15
  This can be accomplished in part by 
international institution building.  By heightening international institutions commonalities 
between differing societies are more easily reached.  These commonalities will in turn 
influence cultural values and norms and can eventually bring lifeworlds closer together. I 
argue that though it is possible to work toward communicative action in an anarchic 
system, it is not enough to guarantee communicative action will take place. 
 
Logic of 
Consequentialism 
Logic of arguing 
Logic of 
appropriateness 
Logic of truth seeking 
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Similar to Risse and Mitzen, Harald Muller adapts Habermas‟s theory of communication 
to emphasize the role international institutions play in bringing reasoned argumentation 
to the international system.  Muller asserts, “we discovered that arguments of non-state 
actors influenced negotiations, despite powerful actors holding diametrically opposed 
preferences.”16  Institutions play a critical role because they allow the public sphere to 
participate in negotiations.  Participation has increased over the years due to the progress 
of communications technology and the increased ease of accessibility to debates for the 
public sphere.  Institutions also help to inform the public of the debates that take place on 
the international stage.  This in turn allows, “institutions, which are characterized by 
densely and largely non-hierarchical settings, (to) help foster trust and empathy between 
participants and establish equal rights of participation.”17  The role of facilitator between 
powerful actors in the international system and the public sphere helps to give power to 
international institutions as they aim to move toward reasoned argumentation.  
International institutions are key actors, according to Muller. 
 
Globalist Focus 
Andrew Linklater extrapolates from Habermas and moves toward a globalist, 
cosmopolitan vision in rethinking the current international system and progress toward 
world citizenship.  Linklater uses the analysis of harm inflicted in the international 
system to further the need to develop Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions (CHC) that would 
be present in a global cosmopolitan polity.
18
  According to Linklater, “what makes a 
harm convention cosmopolitan is the fact that it does not privilege the interests of insiders 
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over outsiders.”19  The inclusion of freedom from harm for all citizens‟ differentiates the 
cosmopolitan idea from the current state system where citizens are often mobilized to 
defend and privilege the „insider‟ at the expense of the „outsider‟.  Rather than being a 
citizen of the state, one is a citizen of the world.  According to Linklater, “more 
cosmopolitan forms of national and international law are obvious ways in which the 
hitherto imperfect rights of outsiders can be made more perfect.”20  Linklater argues, 
citizens “have an obligation to form themselves into a transnational citizenry in which the 
members of different states assume political responsibility for the harm they cause one 
another.”21  To Linklater, the idea of the “idea of citizenship is an important moral 
resource which can be used to imagine communities which overcome domination and 
exclusion.”22 
 
In addition to the role of the citizen, Linklater examines the role legitimacy has played in 
the modern era to increasing states morality.
23
  Legitimacy, to Linklater, helps to “decide 
rights of representation in world politics (and) have changed over the centuries.”24  
Through standards of legitimacy, the public sphere is now being engaged in decision-
making, even if it is at the periphery.  This is unique in the history of state systems 
predating the modern state system.
25
  Furthermore, for Linklater, “as the phenomenon of 
transnational harm has grown in importance, international law has come under pressure 
to support the same cosmopolitan commitments.”26  The movement of the international 
system toward a globalized assertion to eradicate harm has moved one step closer to a 
global cosmopolitan society, that does not inflict harm for reasons such as territorial 
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disputes, power, and wealth that have been so prevalent in the wars among states and 
citizens in the modern state system.  Though Linklater agrees that the modern state 
system is historically different, he also contends “…progress in world affairs requires 
first a radical redistribution of power and wealth…”27 This progress toward a global 
citizenry places the individual, the citizen, at the core of a new international system. 
 
I contend that the reasoned argumentation aided by international institutions has greater 
merit in the current system and international relations.  By positing Habermas within the 
confines of an anarchic international system, Risse, Mitzen and Muller have created a 
more relevant argument for the principles of Communicative Action Theory.  However, 
the progress that Linklater speaks to is situated too far outside the current international 
system to be applicable in today‟s political realm.  In the following chapters, I will 
examine the in greater detail the role of international institutions. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
I have adopted a discursive framework to analyze the problem of order and power in 
international politics.  The framework is based on Jürgen Habermas‟s writings on 
communicative action theory and legitimization.  Drawing on Habermas allows me to 
shed theoretical light on order and legitimacy by examining rational persuasion and 
reasoned argumentation.  Through this process, actors are able to reach compromise and 
mutual understanding of one another‟s other point of view.  All the while, this process 
leads actors to build a greater defined link between self-interest and the rational pursuit 
for public goods. 
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  Empirically I will focus on two issue-areas (1) problems of the legitimization 
process in international relations: war or the conflict in Kosovo and the U.S. led war in 
Iraq, and (2) the new role of transnational institutions in bringing together legitimization 
and order in the international system, specifically the European Union and the 
International Criminal Court.  The Kosovo War is contextually important because it 
allows us to examine the breakdown of reasoned argumentation and the consequences 
suffered. The International Criminal Court is vital to examine in the context of Habermas 
as it represents the importance legitimacy and international law now at play in the 
international system. 
 
Outline 
In chapter one I discuss some of the historical beginnings and progression of this 
legitimization process in communicative action by outlining a Habermasian-based strand 
within international relations.  I begin to outline what communicative action theory is and 
how it can affect the lifeworld in order to heighten argumentation within the international 
system.  Within this context, I examine Habermas‟s theory of Communicative Action, 
including lifeworld.  I then move to examine the legitimization crisis and how this crisis 
works within and through communicative action, moreover to look at the legitimization 
process in order to scrutinize what it means to gain legitimacy in the international system, 
who dictates this process, and how it is changing.  This will lead into Habermas‟s theory 
of world organization and his use of the cosmopolitanization of law. 
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The second chapter I will examine the applications of communicative action theory that 
other international relations theorists have made in international politics.   I will focuses 
on issues facing international relations with the legitimization process and the unstable 
international order and examine the difficulties that exist in applying Habermas‟s theory 
to the international system.  I argue that in the current anarchic international system there 
is a thin conception of lifeworld that hinders communication between actors. I will 
examine how state sovereignty perpetuates the anarchic system and facilitate the constant 
security dilemma states face. However, there are benefits that exist in applying this 
theory to the international system that I will apply. 
 
The third chapter examines cosmopolitanism and how we have to address and develop 
institutional cosmopolitanism in order to meet the current political issues facing the 
international system.  I will give examples of disagreements that have led to violent 
rather than peaceful outcomes. These disagreements are examples of the breakdown in 
communication between states that were for one reason or another unable to find 
consensus in their arguments.  The lack of ability for states to use communicative action 
in these instances caused violent outcomes that highlighted the inability of 
communicative action to take place in an anarchic system. By doing so, I examine the 
effects of coercion on the international system by conducting a case study on both 
NATO‟s role in the conflict in Kosovo and the U.S. led war in Iraq.  My aim is to study 
the difference between what has been argued by some as a legitimate intervention in 
Kosovo and an illegitimate war in Iraq.  I will then move on to a focus on bringing 
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together legitimization and order.  Through power politics, state sovereignty and the 
anarchic order of the international system suppresses the full capabilities of international 
institutions, I will argue that certain international institution such as the EU and the ICC 
have shown us instances where legitimization and order were able to grow within the 
anarchic international system.   
 
My conclusion focuses on the implications of Habermas‟s cosmopolitan vision in hopes 
of leading toward a global civil society.  Habermas‟s cosmopolitan vision is inclusive of 
the state.  The state continues to plays a role in the international system, just not the sole 
powerful role that now exists.  I will examine Habermas‟s cosmopolitan vision to 
extrapolate the role of the state in the international system. 
14 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Habermas’s Theory Communicative Action 
 
Jürgen Habermas‟s theory of communicative action refers to action-oriented 
argumentation between actors that is not strategic or for the sole benefit of upholding 
one‟s own point of view, but argumentation for the benefit of the whole.  Communicative 
action aims to promote mutual understanding among agents. As actors, there is a shared 
understanding that leads to an outcome that is inherently reasonable.  When actors 
communicate or argue for the ultimate outcome of promoting the better argument, reason 
and rationality have been exercised to their full extent.  In order for communicative 
action to be realized, there are foundational pieces that must first be flushed out. 
Habermas‟s theory of communication action utilizes three main tenets: Lifeworld, 
Legitimacy, and Validity Claims (authenticity, rightness, truth,) to create a space where 
communicative action can exist. 
 
Lifeworld is the world that surrounds us and what we take for granted as what „is‟.  
According to Habermas, “the Lifeworld forms the indirect context of what is said, 
discussed, addressed in a situation...”28 Though lifeworld is a constant within one‟s own 
life, according to Habermas, “the lifeworld…is in turn limited and changed by the 
structural transformation of society as a whole.”29  Habermas uses “lifeworld as 
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analytical concept(s) of order.”30   Order in the sense that lifeworlds help to manage 
societies by perpetuating socially acceptable norms.  Moreover, adaptive lifeworlds can 
bring upon new societal order by changing socially accepted norms.  Impacts on one‟s 
lifeworld can be cultural, media driven, or family/tradition imposed.  Lifeworld is 
impacted by day-to-day interactions and overarching cultural norms for society as a 
whole.  As Axel Honneth points out, “the lifeworld continues to be the more 
comprehensive concept of order (in regards to system) given that the media steered 
subsystems are differentiated out from the social component of the lifeworld via the 
specialization of the universal medium of language”.31  For this reason, lifeworlds can be 
heavily influenced not only by one‟s own culture, but also through the emergence of 
international institutions and by other cultures around the globe.  Lifeworld is a 
repository of cultural values. 
 
Habermas uses the concept of a lifeworld to bridge different cultures together.  When 
communicative action takes place, Habermas claims “the lifeworld always remains in the 
background.  It is the unquestioned ground of everything given in my experience, and the 
unquestionable frame in which all the problems I have to deal with are located.”32  It is a 
storehouse.  Even if actors do not appear to have similar lifeworlds, the minimal 
commonalities within one‟s lifeworld can serve for the basis of mutual 
understanding…where actors can begin to reason with one another.  Thomas Risse, for 
instance, argues that “Lifeworld is the intuitively present, in this sense familiar and 
transparent, and at the same time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions that have 
16 
 
to be satisfied if an actual utterance is to be at all meaningful, that is valid or invalid.”33  
We create our lifeworld around what we have experienced.  For this reason, the public 
sphere is a reflection of the world that society has created in general and a reflection of 
lifeworld specifically.   
 
Legitimization is the process actors take in giving legitimacy to institutions, political 
order, law or social order by attaching it to the norms and values of society.  
Legitimization is a core component of communicative action.  Lifeworlds pre-given 
cultural understanding informs the actors on what, according to their norms and values, is 
legitimate.  Habermas argues that the lulling of society has diminished the legitimization 
process within society.  Communicative action, where actors communicate by employing 
reason, can lead to legitimacy. Habermas expresses the legitimization process as a key 
feature to moving beyond the current state of affairs.  Common worldviews that societies 
possess have the potential to help increase the legitimization process of institutions.  
According to Habermas, “the legitimating power of worldviews is to be explained 
primarily by the fact that cultural knowledge can meet with rationally motivated 
approval.”34  The law plays a vital role in Habermas‟s legitimization process.  
International law is one way for societies to adopt common values and norms by adhering 
to a universal code on issues such as human right. 
 
By creating a space where all cultures can identify with each other, Habermas has set the 
grounds for commonalities in lifeworlds that can be the basis for communicative action.  
17 
 
International law has the opportunity to circumvent the sovereignty of the state, though 
minimally, in order to uphold common held beliefs in the international system, such as 
basic human rights.  Roach contends, “for Habermas, the lawmaking process of … 
argumentation, deliberation, and bargaining…link the force of the better argument with 
the legitimization of norms.”35  Why is legitimacy so important?  Inis L. Claude asserts, 
“legitimacy, in short, not only makes most rulers more comfortable but makes all rulers 
more effective – more secure in the possession of power and more successful in its 
exercise.”36  Legitimacy helps society to promote institutions that reflect its values and 
norms.  It provides a structure to evaluate institutions and their ability to work within and 
for the society that supports them.  One way that society is able to legitimize institutions 
is by enacting validity claims.  In Habermas‟s notion of universal pragmatics, he refers to 
validity claims as they reflect the truth of assertions made (conformity with perceived 
facts in the world), moral rightness of the norms underlying the argument, and 
truthfulness and authenticity of a speaker.  
 
Validity claims allow for an actor to legitimize the speech acts of another actor.  In 
deconstructing an actor‟s argument, validity claims can be determined through evaluating 
its truthfulness, its rightness and its authenticity.  When determining the validity of a 
claim, an actor examines both the argument itself and the person making the claim.  This 
process allows, “one to distinguish the illocutionary binding forces of action oriented 
toward reaching an understanding.”37  Truthfulness is a function of the rationality of the 
speech acts and if the argument encompasses reason, as it relates to the lifeworld of the 
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agent to whom the argument is posed.  Truthfulness is encompassed within the actor that 
is making an argument.  For if the agent making an argument is himself not seen as 
trustworthy then his claims toward truth are invalidated.  Claims of rightness are also 
dependent on the source as well as the message.  In this claim agents depend on reflecting 
on the speech act to determine if “an action is right or appropriate in relation to a certain 
normative context, or that such a context deserves to be recognized as legitimate.”38  
Each of the validity claims are dependent upon commonalities in the lifeworlds of the 
actors.  Common lifeworlds enable mutual understanding of the argument(s) as each 
actor has a familiar reference point to gauge validity claims.  In order to examine the 
truthfulness, rightness, and authenticity of an argument one must reflect on his or her own 
lifeworld…one‟s own norms, values, and past lived experiences.   
 
Legitimacy of an argument can be explored by examining how valid the claims of an 
argument are.  Because validity claims can be questioned, therein lies the ability to work 
though reason and rationality in order to gain understanding and ultimately support the 
better argument.  We use validity claim in our day-to-day interactions within our 
community by calling upon our lifeworlds.  Society helps to shape validity claims by 
imposing social norms and values that are inherent in a given society.  From these social 
norms, we can deduce if an argument falls within the confines of our own knowledge of 
the value of the argument.  Habermas argues that by drawing a connecting line between 
lifeworlds, actors can find space to reason.  From a high level, lifeworlds may seem 
disjointed; however, focusing in on the minutia of a lifeworld can expose comparatively 
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similar aspects that will allow seemingly incompatible actors to communicate within a 
realm where speech acts can be validated.  In the following chapter, I will go into greater 
detail of how these core tenets of communicative action theory (lifeworld, legitimacy, 
and validity claims) can be used in the international system to bring together actors that 
seem to have little in common and give them the tools to communicate on a level that 
upholds reason in argumentation. 
 
In Chapter Two, I focus on communicative action theory in the international realm.  
There are some key items to note about the international system that Habermas in 
particular and communicative action in general struggle with.  Power in the international 
system has been a difficulty in International Relations Theory (IR theory).  Habermas 
attempts to justify power in communicative action by including the nation-state as an 
actor in the system.  However, unlike other IR theories such as Realism, where power is 
determined by a states relative capability in the system, Habermas attempts to bring in the 
public sphere as a method of using the citizens to uphold the legitimacy of power 
structures and authority.  For Realists, in particular, states pursue their interests defined as 
power where power is a zero sum game.  Habermas has structured communicative action 
theory in a way that is pragmatic.  He allows theorists in IR to address and resolve 
problems by assessing the discursive requirements for instituting norms and values. 
 
Communicative action theory attempts to utilize validity claims, legitimization and 
lifeworlds to get past the limitation of power on the international system.  Another aspect 
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of the international system that Habermas encounters is the anarchic „nature‟ of the 
international system.  Anarchic in that a hierarchy does not exist at the international level.  
The international community does not have an overarching authority that is responsible 
for running or policing the world.  Therefore, cooperation among states that are suspicion 
of each other can be difficult to achieve.  In the following chapter I aim to show how 
Habermas‟s theory of communicative action  sheds light on the problems and limits of an 
anarchic system run  and allows us to move toward a global civil society reflective of the 
will of the citizen. 
 
In sum, Habermas shows how legitimization can function as a means to “justify a 
political order or the institutional framework of a society in general.”39  In regards to the 
function of the state regarding legitimacy and identity, according to Habermas, “the 
problem with the sovereign state…is that as a „limited moral community‟ it promotes 
exclusion, generating estrangement, injustice, insecurity and violent conflict between 
self-regarding states by imposing rigid boundaries between „us‟ and „them‟.”40  These 
shortcomings of the state do not allow the international system to move past self-interest.  
Why is this so?  The inevitability of the self-interest of states creates a barrier for critical 
theorists to cross. In examining the legitimization process we must first observe the 
current international order and those that have the power to grant legitimacy to 
institutions: the state.  I will begin by outlining international relations and how it has 
evolved over the past 60 years.  I will also focus on communicative action theory‟s 
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introduction to international relations, and how, over time, it has been utilized in the 
international system. 
 
Legitimization Process in International Relations: 
Legitimacy provides a space where authority is subject to and directed by law.  “In 
modern politics, it is reason rather than power or violence which has become the measure 
of legitimacy,” argues Richard Devetak.41  Legitimization processes allow for meaningful 
value to be attached to an object that promotes its definition or understanding within the 
norms of a society.  In Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics Ian Hurd argues 
that there are “three generic reasons why an actor might obey a rule: (1) because the actor 
fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule as in its own 
self-interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and out to be obeyed.”42  
By examining why actors „act‟ or for that matter, „don‟t act‟, we can gain understanding 
into the international order and what brings about legitimization among participants and 
what that „pecking order‟ is. 
 
John Dryzek asserts in Legitimacy Economy in Deliberative Democracy that legitimacy 
can be seen as valid when participation from the majority is employed.
43
  However, it is 
not my contention that the key to attaining legitimacy is participation by the majority 
citizen group; rather it is the acceptance by the majority citizen group that creates 
legitimacy. “The process of legitimization is ultimately a political phenomenon, a 
crystallization of judgment that may be influenced but is unlikely to be wholly 
determined by legal norms and moral principles.”44  What types of rules do participants 
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use to influence the international system to grant them legitimacy?  How do they win the 
favor of the masses?  Does this comfort breed complacency by demanding a more just 
international system that fosters human rights for all its citizens?  We cannot allow for 
the current international system to ignore the moral claim put forth by other actors in 
order to obtain consensus among other actors because the anarchic order does not claim 
them to be legitimate.  How do we get away from this state determined process of 
legitimization?  For Pierre Englebert, the issue is that “in short, state legitimacy breeds 
state capacity.”45  By moving the legitimization process past the realm of the state to a 
more global arena, we would circumvent the anarchic baggage that it brings, (a monopoly 
on violence within its territory, an unstable international order, the security dilemma) by 
linking the uncoercive aspects of moral persuasion with the efficacy of norms.  
Legitimacy in this sense would help to explain this link.  However, within 
communicative action theory, there is the challenge of explicating the role or the impact 
of power in the international system. In chapter four, I will address this challenge of the 
legitimization process and order and how it relates to the European Union and the 
International Criminal Court. I will also address the above questions in an attempt to 
highlight the potentialities and limitations of legitimization. 
 
Theory of World Organization and Cosmopolitanization of Law 
There are two components of Habermas‟ cosmopolitan vision that help to outline an 
approach to a global civil society.  Habermas discusses the creation of a Global Network 
that would ultimately shape society.  Most importantly to notice is that this global 
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structure would not divide the world into peoples based upon ethnicity or nationality. 
Hohendahl asserts, whereas the global network encompasses all, it is vital and essential 
for “culture…to be treated as a part of the social system in which it operates.”46  This 
being said, Habermas does not condone a global system to be homogeneous in that it 
takes on the characteristics of one nation, ethnicity or geographical region.  Rather he 
emphasizes the importance of the individual and their rights as citizens of the world and 
the importance for maintaining one‟s own culture.47  The current world system has the 
primary source of power headed by the state.  Habermas does not argue that the state will 
be insignificant but rather that “the state becomes necessary as a sanctioning, organizing, 
and executive power because rights must be enforced…”48 The world system is 
dependent on the state to maintain order and administer law.  By establishing a structure 
that would bear the burden of maintaining law and order, the role of the state would 
become minimized but not eliminated.  The disintegration of the state is not promoted in 
Habermas‟ writing, though it is vital to mention that a main goal of establishing a global 
civil society would be to break up the monopoly that states have on violence, be it legal 
or illegal. 
 
By dismantling the totalizing power of the state, greater equity would be given to the 
citizens of the world.  This method of community would decrease the effects that 
nationalism has on the world system.  Rather than seeing somebody across the border as 
“them” they would be received as an equal citizen requiring equal rights.  This global 
network has the potential to help change the structure of the world system, which will in 
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turn also change the shape of society.  Through this cosmopolitan vision, the promotion 
of individual rights could then lead to communities‟ rights impacted not by the nation-
state, but rather by a global network of structures that promote a unified understanding of 
rights. According to William E. Scheuerman, “the non-selective application of 
cosmopolitan law desired by Habermas inevitably engenders the spector if not of a hyper-
centralized world state, then at least the possibility of a supranatural order in which for all 
practical purposes the UN (United Nations) operates, in the final instance, as military 
arbiter.”49  International institutions would foster community involvement while at the 
same time upholding the values and norms established by a global civil society. 
 
A second main aspect of Habermas‟ cosmopolitan vision is the promotion of universal 
human rights.  In Between Facts and Norms by Habermas, the first chapter focuses on the 
rights of the individual and how they are tied into the current legal structure.  These rights 
are a beacon of freedom and liberty for the individual.  Not only do they create a space 
for the individual to operate in society, but it also allows for the development and 
progress of a capitalist economy and therefore, “modern law is especially suited for the 
social integration of economic societies, which rely on the decentralized decisions of self-
interested individuals in morally neutralized spheres of actions.”50  By establishing 
structures that promote universal human rights, a more just world system can be 
accomplished.  However, in order to accomplish this feat, rights would have to be 
administered through a global body that assumed major authority.  This body would 
circumvent the biases of the state, which has, in the past, violated basic human rights of 
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its citizens.  This can be seen in Nazi Germany or in the genocide in Rwanda.  The state 
doesn‟t have a monopoly on abuses of human rights, but they are often the culprits.  
Without a system or structure to monitor the actions of a state and more importantly have 
power over the state to administer human rights, these rights cannot be experienced on a 
universal level. 
 
The implementation of universal human rights is achieved through the creation of a 
Global Network.  There are already global structures in place that attempt to place 
controls on the actions of states, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
United Nations; however, these bodies do not have the backing or the power to enforce 
the laws of human rights worldwide.  By giving greater legitimacy to these global 
structures, the application of universal human rights could be realized.  In doing this, 
Habermas recommends “national sovereignty must be limited by respect for universal 
human rights and that differing peoples must be allowed to interpret these rights in 
accordance with their own particular political traditions, at least within limits.”51  A 
governing body that would have the authority on a global level to enforce the rights of 
global citizens would force those in power to respect the rights of those they have power 
over.  Habermas states in The Divided West: 
 
“Hence, „establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a 
part…but rather the final end of the doctrine of right.‟ The idea of „peaceful, 
even if no yet friendly thoroughgoing community of all nations‟ is a 
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principle of right, not merely a command of morality.‟  The cosmopolitan 
condition is just the condition of peace made permanent.”52 
 
In sum, Habermas‟ cosmopolitan vision takes advantage of the existing power structures 
as a pathway to greater peace in the world.  By incorporating these structures, such as the 
state, movement toward a cosmopolitan global society becomes more relevant because it 
is within the confined of the existent power structure. 
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Chapter Two:  Challenges to Global Order: Real Politik 
 
The current international order is one of anarchy where states are the main actors.  States 
can be defined as having territorially defined borders that have a population and are 
controlled by a government, which answers to no higher authority.  Most importantly, the 
state has sovereignty over its own territory.  State sovereignty refers to a state‟s ability to 
make and enforce laws, or to control affairs within a territorially defined set of borders. 
One of the key issues of state sovereignty is whether the state's right tends to conflict 
with its international obligations to promote and maintain peaceful relations among 
(other) states.  This issue also underscores the security dilemma (discussed earlier), which 
in turn reflects a condition of an unstable international order.  States foreground action 
with the premise that survival is of the utmost importance and since this is the case, the 
tension between what‟s best for the state and what‟s best for humanity is often strained. 
Habermas‟s communicative action theory, as I have argued, allows us to understand the 
requiems for a cosmopolitan peace that promises to move us past the instability 
associated with power politics Let me first begin by looking at the influence that 
Habermas has had on international politics. 
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Habermas’s Influence on International Politics: 
In examining how Habermas has influenced international politics, I will look at the 
contributions made by international relations scholars. According to Jennifer Mitzen, 
communicative action is the “exchange of reasons oriented toward understanding”53 
while Thomas Risse describes it as a goal to “seek a reasoned consensus.”54  Both 
scholars use communicative action as a basis for argumentation to take place among 
friendly and opposing actors. Within communicative action, reason, goals, validity claims 
and Intersubjective recognition come together.  As Habermas states,  
 
“We can say that actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations, and 
also evaluative expressions, supplement constative speech acts in constituting a 
communicative practice which, against the background of a lifeworld, is oriented 
to achieving, sustaining, and renewing consensus – and indeed a consensus that 
rests on the Intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims.  The 
rationality inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively 
achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons.”55 
 
Dealing with different cultures presents barriers and poses questions on the ability and 
willingness of actors to communicate on an equal level.  Habermas asserts, "the concept 
of communicative action presupposes the use of language as a medium for reaching 
understanding, in the course of which participants, through relating to a world, 
reciprocally raise validity claims that can be accepted or contested,” which in essence is a 
“model of action.”56  However, language can compound the problem to effective 
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communicative dialogue, as one actor may be better able to argue their goal more acutely 
and rationally in a specific language.  How do we get past this?   According to Habermas, 
“to avoid misunderstanding I would like to repeat that the communicative model of 
action does not equate action with communication.  Language is a medium of 
communication that serves understanding…”57 This being said, reasoned dialogue 
demands acknowledgement from all parties in order to account for the inequalities.   
 
Thus, as Ferguson and Mansbach point out, “communication has to foster not only a 
sense of common identity but also of political efficacy, a belief on the part of individuals 
that they can improve their lot or at least protect what they have if they associate with one 
another.”58  In the international realm Habermas argues that, "the actors seek to reach an 
understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate 
their actions by way of agreement... a type of interaction that is coordinated through 
speech acts and does not coincide with them."
59
  Understanding of norms and nuances 
within a language are not as easy to learn outside of one‟s own culture, but if we make 
this difference known at the beginning, communicative action can take place. Michael 
Rabinder James asserts, “true understanding is achieved only when actors can reach 
actual, partial agreements about cultural meanings that can withstand potential 
criticism… (which) is the ground for mutual understanding.”60  According to Habermas, 
these meanings can be established in a way to withstand criticism in part by creating a 
similar lifeworld.  
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By creating a space for actors to communicate in a way that promotes reason and 
rationality, the international system can move past its violent tendencies and move 
toward a more civil means of international policy.  Habermas defines communicative 
action as “the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action that 
establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra verbal means).”61 This 
framework creates a space where reason is used to move between the goals of two actors 
in order to reach understanding.  
 
We can also see the impact of Habermas (via Risse) in international relations by 
examining the impact that argumentation has made on the field.  Argumentation takes 
place within communicative action, which is in itself based upon one‟s lifeworld. When 
looking at argumentation, Michael Rabinder James examines argumentation in relation to 
power, for “argumentation itself may function as a form or power, since certain actors 
may be better equipped to engage in argumentative contests than others.”62 Habermas 
asserts that rationality in speech or communicative rationality leads to argumentation 
where “an argument contains reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic way 
with the validity claim of a problematic expression.”63  Reason and rationality must be 
built into an argument for it to withstand validity claim that may deconstruct the basis of 
an argument.  As stated earlier, these claims consist of truth, morality and strategy and 
are all rooted in universal norms.  The use of reason allows actors to build understanding 
on common ground and universal norms. 
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It is also vital to note the difference between communicative action and strategic action.  
Communicative action involves moral persuasion while strategic action refers to the 
calculation of one's interests.
64
  When two actors come together to dialogue an issue, they 
come together with their own sets of goals and ideas.  Strategic action leads these two 
actors to discuss their immediate concerns (threats) and interests, while communicative 
action leads them a step further to an “orientation towards…the cognitive frameworks 
within which goals are sought,” according to James.65  James differentiates between 
communicative action and strategic action by asserting that strategic action includes 
“actors (who) pursue their goals while incorporating how others may react strategically to 
their actions.”66  Communicative action according to Habermas is “governed by binding 
consensual norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behavior and which must 
be understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects.”67  Strategic action on the 
other hand only “requires actors to recognize each other as strategically competent and 
rational,” James argues.68  At a basic level, communicative action takes arguing between 
two actors beyond the simple rhetoric that strategic action can encompass and brings 
actors to the same level so they are able to communicate from the same root level rather 
than as one being powerful and one being weak.  Now, I am not asserting that 
communicative action does not include rhetoric, because often when an actor is using 
strategic argumentation, it is communicated through rhetorical claims.  When these 
communicative actions take place, James warns, one must be cautious, as “the danger 
exists that some manifestations of strategic action may undermine the solidaristic basis 
for communicative action in plural societies.”69  
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In order to be able to reach the point of argumentation within the realm of communicative 
action, one must bridge together actors‟ lifeworlds. According to Hans-Peter Kruger, 
“Habermas assumes that communicative action and lifeworld can complement one 
another.”70 Within these common lifeworlds, argumentation can take place.  
Argumentation within and across lifeworlds is an integral part to communicative action.  
A common lifeworld can be categorized as “a supply of collective interpretations of the 
world and of themselves,” according to Risse.71 How can true communicative action take 
place across lifeworlds that are dissimilar?  Habermas argues that it is not the 
dissimilarities that we focus on, but the similarities of each lifeworld and from there build 
a base of argumentation.  For that reason, according to James, communicative action 
“presupposes either a common lifeworld of shared meanings that the actors wish to 
preserve or the ability and willingness to understand the lifeworld of the other.”72  
According to the basic tenets of communicative action, we need to form lifeworlds in the 
international system that possesses commonalities.  However, we must ask: Are we 
capable of utilizing the commonalities of lifeworlds in an anarchic system that often 
inhibits communicative action?   
 
Anarchy can be described as the absence of a worldwide government or international 
governing body.  It is in essence the absence of a hierarchical international structure 
producing conflict and the security dilemma.  Security dilemma in the international 
system refers to the relationship between and among states as one that lacks trust in part 
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due to each states preoccupation with power.  The anarchic state is not part of the theory 
of communicative action because a substantive dialogue does not exist between states.  
Realism asserts that international system is anarchic, meaning there is no central 
authority that governs the international system.
73
  The anarchic reality of the international 
order forces states to fear each other.
74
  This leads to the uncertainty among and between 
states, which have no way of knowing the true intentions of other states.  States are 
fearful of one another where the „state of nature‟ is a state of war.  This in essence creates 
a security dilemma.
75
 While realists do not mean that the world is perpetually at war, they 
do mean that war is a part of the nature of the international system.   
 
Conflict between states can, and often does, result in war. The international system is one 
of self-help.
76
  Survival is the primary goal of any state in a self-help system and it must 
come before any moral and ideological concerns, otherwise the state may cease to exist.
77
  
This aspect of the international system concerns the unwillingness of some hegemonic 
states to support the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court (ICC).  For those 
states unwilling to enter into international agreements, there is a fear that binding legality 
could hinder their ability to act according to the sole need of the nation in order to 
survive.  States are concerned with achieving a better position as opposed to that of their 
rivals through relative gains. The concern with achieving relative gains inhibits 
cooperation because states must be careful to maximize their own power.   
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Liberalism also sees the word as anarchic, however, according to Scott Burchill, 
liberalism raises a challenge to the idea of an international system existing in anarchy.  
M. Doyle argues that there are a number of states that are resolving differences without 
violence.
78
  Furthermore, Robert Keohane cites the creation of informational structures 
that come from international institutions.  These structures “determine what principles are 
acceptable as the basis for reducing conflicts and whether governmental actions are 
legitimate or illegitimate.”79  International institutions also work to establish international 
law that cuts across differences within societies and cultures.  It established cooperation 
among actors in that they facilitate cooperation and lead to greater transparency. For 
liberalism, self-help requires stronger international institutions.  Here Keohane argues 
that, “international institutions help states achieve collective gains.”80  Furthermore, 
according to Burchill, neoliberals believe that states are more interested in absolute gains, 
which is why states can cooperate with each other.
81
  Though there is an overarching 
presence of anarchy, liberalism tries to transcend its implications in part by fostering 
cooperation among actors. 
 
Sovereign states have had the understanding that what happens within the borders of a 
state is not the concern of other states.  There is an acceptance and recognition that the 
state is in control of its own territory.  Two instances where there can be legitimate 
intervention from other states are when there is evidence of international crimes or a state 
is threatening the security of another state.  In other words, a state has complete and total 
jurisdiction over what happens in their territorial boundaries. According to William E. 
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Scheuerman, “national sovereignty is a historically variable legal “construct,” but it 
remains a construct that justifies an impressive array of “real” or material advantages.”82  
However, I argue that over the years, there has been a notion that state sovereignty‟s 
influence on the international system has declined.  This does not mean that an unstable 
international order is now more stable, but rather the powers of other actors such as 
transnational corporations (world capitalists‟), international organizations (ICC, EU, 
WTO), NGO‟s (Amnesty International), social movements and international terrorist 
organizations have weakened state sovereignty.
83
 
 
State sovereignty is still a powerful force in the international system; however, other 
groups are rivaling this power.  Multinational Corporations have increased their influence 
on state sovereignty through the tools such as economics and communications.  With the 
concept of state sovereignty in mind, organizations and MNC‟s have influence over 
decisions that are made within the territorial borders of a state.  The need for economic 
stability within states has forced state sovereignty to decrease.  The European Union (EU) 
is a congregate of European nation-states that have come together to, among other things; 
increase their influence on the international system.  These nation-states standing alone 
had less influence than when they organized together.  However, each of these European 
states had to relinquish some aspects of state sovereignty and autonomy to this 
transnational institution, where according to Englebert, “as a consequence, the capacity of 
the state is weakened.”84  International organizations have moved from bringing their 
own agenda‟s to states, according to Ferguson, by “becoming authoritative actors in their 
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own right, with legitimacy derived from expertise, information and innovative political 
techniques, especially direct action.”85  Post-international thinking in essence asserts that 
sovereignty is a social construct.  Looking at this unstable international order gives us 
insight into what leads to violence within the system.  If post-internationalist thinking is 
correct and if sovereignty is a social construct, can this construct be changed to help 
move away from sovereignty bent on power, towards a more reasonable form of order 
not consumed with power politics? 
 
To reiterate my earlier argument: communicative action in international relations will 
help to build a global civil society.  Habermas‟s universal pragmatics offers a way to 
move beyond the built in instability that fosters anarchy.  According to Jennifer Mitzen, 
this unstable international order promotes a space where disagreements among states 
devolve into violence.  I agree with Mitzen‟s assessment of the international system: that 
it promotes the breakdown of communication and dialogue to the point where 
disagreements break down into aggression.  She argues that “a major impediment is 
mistrust at a structural level: the security dilemma.”86  As I shall demonstrate later, we 
can see that in instances such as the Kosovo conflict in the mid-to late 1990‟s and the 
Iraq War in 2003, there are examples where dialogue, diplomacy, and communication all 
broke down into violence; more specifically, where a lack of openness on the part of the 
Yugoslavian and Iraqi governments, inadequate and inaccurate intelligence and a total 
breakdown of reasoned argumentation disagreements lapsed into violence. 
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Despite these recurrent factors, Jennifer Mitzen argues that it is possible to move toward 
communicatively based repertoire in the anarchic system by utilizing international 
institutions.
87
  This offsets the security dilemma that states face by opening 
communication and increasing transparency among arguing actors.  These international 
institutions also create a space where there are common worldviews that help to bring 
understanding among actors.  However, when these institutions are unable to mitigate 
arguments, it can break down into violence. I do agree with Mitzen‟s assessment that 
disagreements can devolve into violence in part due to the closed communication 
between and among actors.  International institutions, though powerful, are still guests in 
a state-based international system.  These institutions are unable to completely resolve 
the security dilemma, and the zero-sum game that states often play.  Though international 
institutions offer help in circumventing parts of the unstable international order, we will 
see in the two case studies that they do not always assure that reasoned argumentation 
and moral persuasion will lead to a long-term sustainable arrangement of mutual 
cooperation. Coercive practices are one permanent facet of the international system on 
which international institutions must still rely in order to uphold international norms.  
 
Communicative Action and Anarchy 
However, the prevalent anarchic system creates a thin conception of lifeworld.  
According to Jennifer Mitzen, communicative action can be reached in spite of the 
anarchic order through the actions of international institutions. For Mitzen, there is the 
possibility for communicative action in anarchy through “two elements: a thick notion of 
international society and publicity.”88  A thick notion of international society refers to the 
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lifeworlds that are clustered together or have greater similarities, which would emphasize 
similarities rather than differences.  Publicity would utilize public forum, getting „face to 
face‟ with one another and „humanizing‟ the process.  These two elements would in 
effect increase the likelihood of communicative action taking place within an anarchic 
system, according to Mitzen. 
 
In applying communicative action theory to the anarchic order, we can see that in part by 
utilizing validity claim, actors can begin to use communicative action in their 
argumentation.  It can be argued that within an anarchic international system, common 
knowledge cannot be reached because actors do not share common lifeworlds. Risse 
justifies the application of communicative action theory in international relations in part 
by examining common lifeworlds.  He examines how anarchy “…could itself be 
considered a limited common lifeworld…”89  For example, Risse shows that meeting 
these validity claims are a precondition for communicative action.  Within 
communicative action there is an “assumption of common knowledge…” that allows for 
actors to communicate their own perceptions and interests among state and non-state 
actors. 
90
 Another element that is key for heightened communicative action in the 
anarchic system would be to increase the ability for all parties to “get to the table.”91  
Since there is currently no hierarchical system in place each actors is responsible for their 
own involvement.  For the powerful it is easy to get a seat at the table, but for those states 
with relatively little power, not only is it hard to get a seat, but it is difficult to be called 
on to speak or to be listened to.  Take for instance the UN Security Council.  There are 
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five permanent members that have veto power; China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States of America, while only ten other members hold only a two year term.  For 
those countries that are not a part of the UN Security Council, it is hard to have their 
voices heard.  Though non-members are allowed to participate in discussions of the 
Security Council, it is at the discretion of the permanent members, which ultimately leads 
to power disequilibrium.  Furthermore, the anarchic system is by nature a closed 
communication apparatus.  This creates a dilemma in arguing because there are 
misconceptions and suspicions of intentions.  If state A is too concerned about what state 
B may do, they will not be truthful in their intentions and argumentation breaks down in 
rhetorical speech.  
 
International institutions in essence help to create a discursive space, by offering a venue 
for negotiations, moral persuasion and compromise.  In so doing, they help to create a 
collective identity that promote like values and norms.  For example, the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals have fostered the idea that each human should have the 
opportunity, among other things, to get an education.  The UN has entered into 
communities that perhaps did not hold this value as their own and through 
communicating the benefits of education, have altered their values and helped to make 
education a norm for their society.  This is just one example of how international 
institutions help to promote communicative action and cooperation among actors in the 
international system.  Other examples might be the presence of Amnesty International in 
promoting human rights or a communications MNC installing phone lines that connect a 
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small village to the rest of the world which may help foster the exchange of information.  
By creating these areas of common knowledge, argumentation can be based on common 
lifeworlds, thereby providing a normative, discursive space in unstable and anarchic 
international order.  
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Chapter Three: Cosmopolitan Ethics 
 
Building Intersubjectivity into International Law and Politics 
Throughout my earlier chapters I have aimed to show that through communicative action, 
the international order can move toward a global civil society.  This global civil society is 
encompassed within a global public sphere.  According to Rudolf Stichweh, “the global 
public sphere today…is not related to an individual state but consists of a network of 
observations which refers equally to individual states as to interdependencies and 
interactions in the global system of states.”92  It is necessary to move toward a global 
public sphere in order to effectively apply communicative action.  The global public 
sphere is the ideal arena for communicative action to take place.  Within this space 
Intersubjectivity can be brought into dialogues among actors.  Intersubjectivity takes 
away the individual biases that actors may possess.  In working within a public sphere, 
states work more as a team rather than competitors. By using Intersubjectivity in 
evaluating the intentions of the other actors, the interpretations would have been based on 
hard evidence and external facts, rather than on personal feeling and opinions. By 
bringing Intersubjectivity into the global public sphere, actors can feel a connection with 
each other in a way that will inhibit the partisanship that is so prevalent in the current 
international order. 
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The current world order faces new challenges, not only in respect to power and order, but 
also in regards to international law and politics.  The attacks of September 11, 2001 
forced international law into a new era.  How would global terrorist networks be brought 
to justice, whose justice would reign supreme and whose laws would be followed?  Falk 
argues that, “the emergence of such networks has evolved to the point where it is 
plausible to posit the emergence of “global civil society” as a constituency of networks 
committed in various ways to the promotion of attainment.”93 Currently, it seems as 
though international relations is pushing to improve the stability and current anarchic 
reality of the world today.  The key to creating a global civil society is the aid or social 
assistance international institutions bring to differing cultures.  Harmony in the 
international system can be gained by positing international institutions as the „helper‟ in 
fighting terrorism from the ground up.  The Iraq war has shown us that terrorism cannot 
be eliminated through more acts of violence.  We need to get at the root of the problem 
and address the underlying issues that create an „us against them‟ mentality in the 
international order. 
 
Needless to say, there is still disharmony between international theory and diplomatic 
practices.  What is often debated upon in the academic world is not necessarily translated 
into the practices of governments.  The lack of transferability of the theories and 
understandings of the international realm has plagued this discipline.  This struggle is 
also seen internally, for international relation is founded on the understanding that the 
Nation State is the ultimate source of power.  International relations reflect the current 
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power game that is controlled by the state apparatus.  To willingly relinquished power 
seems almost impossible.  The question remains, how can we instill global networks that 
can take power from the states when there is no willingness to give up power and 
promote change?  One such remedy could be the empowerment of international 
institutions.  According to Amitai Etzioni in From Empire to Community (2004), “a 
major source of building blocks of the new global architecture are “nonstate” actors, in 
particular international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), transnational informal 
networks, and social movements.”94 
 
International institutions can promote peace by encouraging negotiations and 
coordinating states.  However, there are some obstacles standing in the way of this 
remedy.  The first is that international institutions lack an external and permanent 
enforcement mechanism to ensure state compliance; essentially the state does not have to 
abide by their authority.  The reason states do abide by requests made by international 
institutions is primarily for self-preservation.  Another problem is that many international 
institutions are run by elites; therefore, they do not take a definably different stance than 
states do.  Without a mix of interests being expressed from around the globe where each 
actor has equal amounts of input, power will not be transferred from the elite to the 
people. There is also the issue of coercion and the demands that the power structure 
places on relationships between international institutions and states. 
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The Effects of Coercion on International Society: When Disagreement Devolves to 
Violence 
How does coercion effect communication in the international system?  To begin with, 
coercion can be defined as “the act or processes of… persuade(ing) or restrain(ing) (an 
unwilling person) by force.”95  Often when actors, states in particular, are communicating 
about their goals, they tend to use coercive actions.  When coercion is used, there is a 
breakdown of communicative action as a whole.  The powerful may coerce a weaker 
state to act in ways that may not benefit itself.  When this scenario takes place, there is a 
breakdown in negotiations/argumentation, and a move toward strategic coercion. 
According to Steven Roach, “strategic coercion is based on two main objectives: 1) to 
study the forms of punishment needed to reverse or stop the action or the adversary; 2) 
and to assess the responsiveness of the coerced to the coercer‟s threat, or the different 
ways in which the target constructs its views of reality.”96  This type of coercion leads 
one group to feel vulnerable and sets the stage for violent outcomes.  According to James, 
“the emergence of violent conflict usually involves the initiation of the security logic in 
one of two ways.  On the one hand, a breakdown of the state‟s coercive apparatus may 
create a quasi-Hobbesian state of nature, wherein groups confront each other in a security 
dilemma.  On the other hand; the security logic can also prompt violence without the 
complete breakdown of the state.”97  The latter type of coercion would be found within 
the existing anarchic system 
 
When states are unable to effectively communicate among each other they begin to 
confront the effects of the security dilemma (where a lack of understanding begets hostile 
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action).  In Realist terms, because states cannot trust one another they are forced to use 
manipulative action in order to gain more than their opponent.  Because of this, “coercive 
incentives, especially legal regulations, competitive incentives, and normative legitimacy 
encourage transnational to become institutionally isomorphic with states,” argues 
James.
98
  I will examine two examples of disagreements that took place in the 
international system that broke down into violence.  I will demonstrate how each of these 
examples highlights the shortcomings of coercion. 
 
Kosovo 
The conflict in Kosovo is one example of coercion among international actors that failed 
and led to violence.  Though coercive attempts were made by the UN and NATO to the 
former Yugoslavian President Milosevic, international institutions were unable to bring 
consensus or understanding.  As I mentioned earlier, James asserted that one of the 
breakdowns in coercive speech would be a return to a “quasi-Hobbesian state of 
nature.”99  James agrees with the argument where “Russell Hardin believes that this 
accurately describes the genesis of violence in the former Yugoslavia, where the death of 
Tito and the economic crises of the late 1980s weakened the coercive, peacekeeping 
capacity of the Yugoslav state.”100  There was a synthesis of a multitude of different 
factors stemming from the end of WWII that impacted the strategic logics Milosevic used 
in dealing with the international community.  The ethnic cleansing that took place in the 
Yugoslavian southern providence of Kosovo challenged the diplomatic strength in the 
international community.  The UN and NATO attempted to end the purging of ethnic 
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Albanians in Kosovo through peaceful and diplomatic means in the beginning.  NATO 
used strategic coercive measure to put a halt to Milosevic‟s terror.  However, one can 
argue that the coercion used did not go far enough to reach understanding among groups.  
By examining the dialogue between the actors, we might agree with Roach, “…the idea 
that humanitarian coercion tends to engender distrust.”101  Here communicative action, 
which is rooted uncoerced dialogue, must contend with the difficult predicament of using 
force to secure a humanitarian or moral outcome. 
 
The conversation between the parties also did not put enough focus on the human cost 
that the conflict would bring, though for actors such as the UN this matter was addressed.  
Rather than focusing on the effects of the people, after the bombing, NATO seemed to 
want to intervene violently without comprehensive analysis of the lives that would be 
lost.  NATO was going in to both save lives all the while aiding in the destruction of 
others.  
 
Both the Serbs and NATO incurred the casualties of the Kosovo War.  This, however, did 
not resolve the above-mentioned predicament.  Coercion, on the one hand, may have 
been used to achieve a moral goal, on the other hand, it also involved threats that dictated 
the dialogical process or forced each of the parties to agree to terms set forth by 
Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State.  In the end, it might be argued that 
NATO gained some legitimacy from the Kosovo War, by demonstrating the political will 
to stop gross violations of international law.  By highlighting ethnic cleansing and human 
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rights violations, NATO appealed to the public at large to stop the atrocities that were 
taking place at the hands of Milosevic.  This evidence after the fact allowed the actions of 
NATO to appear valid, however, we will see in the next case, the inability of the U.S. to 
provide evidence against the Hussein regime prompted the world to see the aggression of 
the U.S. illegitimate. 
 
The Iraq War 
In Habermas's writing, "Letter to America" in 2002, he discussed the legality of the U.S. 
led war in Iraq.  He highlights the United States violation of international law when they 
invaded Iraq without the support of the UN.  There is a tension between the role the U.S. 
played in WWII as the promoter of peace and supporter of international law and the war 
they waged in Iraq.  The below quote highlights the movement on the part of the United 
States from a liberator that used legal means to enter into war (WWII), to an illegal war 
with Iraq.   
 
“Not long ago, a generation of young Germans who were liberated from the Nazi 
regime by American soldiers developed admiration of the political ideals of a 
nation that soon became the driving force in founding the United Nations and in 
carrying out the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. As a consequence, classical 
international law was revolutionized by limiting the sovereignty of nation-states 
... Should this same nation now brush aside the civilizing achievement of legally 
domesticating the state of nature among belligerent nations?”102 
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The current war in Iraq is another example of the breakdown in diplomacy, 
communicative talks, and legitimate use of force in the international system.  The U.S. 
declared war on Iraq in 2003 on the basis of preemptive war to protect the U.S. from 
Saddam Hussein‟s weapons of mass destruction.  The idea of preemptive war came to 
fruition through the Bush Doctrine.  The Bush Doctrine refers to the set of foreign 
policies adopted by the President George W. Bush in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
attacks. In an address to the United States Congress after the attacks, President Bush 
declared that the U.S. would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed 
these acts and those who harbor them," a statement that was followed by the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan.
103
  Subsequently, the Bush Doctrine has come to be identified 
with a policy that permits preventive war against potential aggressors before they are 
capable of mounting attacks against the United States.  The Bush Doctrine is a marked 
departure from the policies of deterrence that generally characterized American foreign 
policy during the Cold War and brief period between the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and 9/11. 
 
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the first application of the doctrine of preemptive 
defense.  Proponents of the war suggested that the world was safer without Saddam 
Hussein in power, and that it was better to fight terrorists overseas than inside America‟s 
borders.  However, critics countered that the war in Iraq created a new cadre of terrorists 
with a training ground battlefield, distracted the U. S. from the “real” war on terrorism 
and al-Qaeda, and created the image of the U. S. as the very sort of rogue nation against 
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which it has lobbied, without regard for international law or the sentiments of the 
international community. 
 
The lead up to the war in the U.S. media was filled with rhetorical and coercive speech.  
Rather than using reason and rationality to disseminate information to the American 
public, the Bush administration used fear and threats to suppress dialogue.  The U.S. went 
before the United Nations with their evidence against the Iraqi regime possessing 
weapons of mass destruction, however, they were unable to gain support within the 
group.  Though the U.S. government tried to use coercive measures to gain approval for 
additional intervention in Iraq, the majority of UN members did not support the US' call 
to arms.   
 
Throughout this whole process, the suppression of dialogue not only ignored the anti-war 
protests worldwide, it also dictated the decision to go to war.  As Amitai Etzioni asserts, 
“the invasion of Iraq was so fiercely opposed by numerous American allies and scores of 
other nations, and it generated unprecedented and coordinated worldwide demonstrations 
and collective outrage…”104 There was a breakdown in understanding between the U.S., 
Iraq, and the UN.  Each actor, especially the US media, seemed unwilling to challenge 
and contest the Bush administration's strategic effort to suppress dialogue concerning the 
reasons to go to war (i.e., weapons of mass destruction).  Moreover, by not cooperating 
with the requests of the UN, Iraq gave weight to the claims of the US that „since they are 
not cooperating, they must have something to hide‟.  This coercive language used by the 
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US government played over and over on the network news shows and eventually 
convinced the majority of U.S. citizens to go to war.  In short, there was little if any 
discursive space for reaching mutual or consensual understanding on the most reasonable 
course of action.  
 
Instituting Moral Principles and Ethical Norms: The New Role of Transnational 
Institutions 
Habermas‟ argues that through the empowerment of transnational democratic 
international institutions there is a possibility for a global network of justice to be 
established.  Looking at the European Union, one can see that there is still the problem of 
the democratic deficit and nation state independence/resistance, and the challenge of 
working towards a “universal” interpretation of law that translates to the equity of the EU 
citizen regardless of their nationality or ethnicity.  Stephen Krasner asserts that “central 
decision-makers attempting to secure their preferences must interact with domestic and 
transnational actors, as well as other states.  Outcomes are a function of the relative 
power of actors.”105  According to Risse, transnational relations can be referred to as 
“…regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state 
agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental 
organization,
106
 (which) permeate world politics in almost every issue-area.”107  Rather 
than being an international system made up of only state actors, non-state actors have not 
only come into play, but they hold legitimate power within the system.  They are often 
the economic powerhouses and representatives of global societies that have often been 
overlooked by states apparatus‟ alone.  The emergence of these institutions changes the 
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landscape of the international system and begs the question; how reliant are these actors 
on the state? 
 
By examining how new institutions require legitimacy to overcome their reliance on 
states we can see that there are difficult in moving past an unstable international order. 
According to William Scheuermann, “powerful global organizations like the WTO or EU 
lack a monopoly on legitimate violence, and they remain normatively and politically 
problematic for many reasons.  (However), they represent, in an apt phrase Habermas 
takes from Brunkhorst, emerging constitutional or “legal orders without a state”.”108  
Though organizations such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court or 
NATO have legitimate power in the international system, they are still reliant on state 
cooperation/power to accomplish their goals.  For instance, the UN may try to combat 
violence in a country that is going through civil strife by sending peace keeping troops; 
however, they do not have the power or authority to fully command these troops, for they 
are under the control of the Security Council.  The Security Council must approve each 
move that is made, which can be a very arduous and time-consuming process.  The UN 
does not have the flexibility or the authority to perform some of the necessary tasks 
needed to quell violence.  That being said, there are two examples that show that there is 
evidence of a potential harmonization of order and argumentation.  The EU and the ICC 
have moved beyond some of the restrictions that the anarchic order places upon 
international institutions by creating a space where either common lifeworlds were forged 
or, as Jennifer Mitzen puts it, a “global positive law” was created.109  This was 
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accomplished not by going against the anarchic international order, but by working 
within the confines and shortcoming to provide a space for critical argumentation that 
promoted the goals of a global civil society. 
 
The EU Public Sphere and Citizenship 
In response to the World Wars in the early 20
th
 century Richard Hermann argues that 
Europe took a consorted “effort to move people‟s thinking and identities beyond the 
nation-state.”110  They did this by establishing the European Union (EU) in an effort to 
bring stability to Europe and open a space where states could negotiate (via dialogue) 
their issues and problems related to the avoidance of war. By creating this transnational 
organization each state had to give up a bit of its sovereignty in order to do what is best 
for the group…diminish the chances of another war.  The creation of the EU was a long 
arduous struggle. Though states wanted to increase security, they did not want to 
relinquish too much control. “Since its establishment under the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ 
has expanded its powers and played a crucial role in promoting integration and over time 
promoting a system of governance that significantly limits states‟ autonomy,” argues 
Simon Collard-Wexler.
111
  The EU has created common set of norms and values around 
which expectations can converge. Still, EU states have not always proved willing to 
relinquish their power and sovereignty.   
 
After all, in the anarchic international system where states tend to maximize their 
interests, power is difficult to relinquish or sacrifice for further assurances of greater 
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regional security, even in transitional polity like the EU. Scholars such as Simon Collard-
Wexler assert that “in opposition to neorealist assumptions, the EU region is not anarchic 
but instead a zone of mixed hierarchy marked by overlapping levels of governance.”112  If 
this is the case, then the EU was able to circumvent the effects of anarchy that require 
states to consider survival against all else.  How could states cooperate under the auspice 
of not only relinquishing power, but also looking out for the needs of other states when 
creating laws and economic policies?  The EU states realized that they were no longer 
playing a zero-sum game.  They were losing power on the global stage, economically and 
politically.  They realized that pooling their resources and giving up some of their 
sovereignty would lead to greater success.  For the EU, there was greater strength in 
numbers.  Large states such as France and Germany did not prey on weaker states when 
the laws of the EU were established.  Rather, they focused their efforts on bringing about 
changes and policies that heightened the progress of smaller states relative to their own 
gains.  
 
Even though some scholars may assert that the EU has overcome the fear and distrust 
associated with anarchy, the EU and its member states must still interact in the anarchic 
international system.  They are not free from the constraints that anarchy places upon 
them.  That being said, it was not only the member states that had to changes their ideas 
of themselves, citizens also had to change their concept of identity from belonging to a 
nation to belonging to a community of nations.  National identity had to be suppressed in 
order to create a stronger whole. According to Collard-Wexler, combined with individual 
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access to the ECJ, direct elections (which are unique as far as international institutions 
go) undermine the inter-governmental paradigm of European politics and highlight the 
direct link between European „citizens‟ and their supranational institutions.”113  This in 
effect has given the citizens more power under the EU than previously as national 
citizens.  They have a greater voice because those in power are not as preoccupied with 
the side effects of operating solely in an anarchic system. This community of nations is 
moving toward a global civil society. 
 
The EU, as opposed to so many critics, has been able to move beyond the security 
dilemma by creating a global public sphere.  This has diminished the probability of war 
or violent conflict among member nations because they have created a space where 
communicative action can take place.  Within the EU, there are common values and 
norms that were established by international law.  All member states must abide by these 
laws in order to create a society where all states are held reliable for their action, be it a 
large powerful state such as France, or a smaller relatively weaker state such as Estonia.  
In short, the EU has been able to work towards a harmonious order based on moral 
persuasion and reasoned argumentation; however, the strategic interests of state can still 
detract from this process, as we have seen most recently with the debt crisis in Greece.  
 
International Criminal Court 
Based in The Hague, The Netherlands, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first 
ever permanent international institution, with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals 
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responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern: genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.  Important to note is that the ICC is independent of the U.N.   
The ICC is the first ever permanent, treaty based, international criminal court established 
to promote the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go 
unpunished.  
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was established on July 17, 1998, 
when 120 States participating in the "United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" adopted the 
Statute. The Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002.  Anyone who commits any of the 
crimes under the Statute after this date will be liable for prosecution by the Court.  Per 
Falk, the ICC “limits territorial sovereignty by making leaders accountable to external 
standards.”114  These standards may not be of the same cultural norms and values that 
they are being held accountable to, but they are the standards that international 
institutions have agreed upon as being inalienable to all citizens of the world. 
 
The ICC is designed to complement existing national judicial systems; however, the 
Court can exercise its jurisdiction if national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate 
or prosecute such crimes, thus being a "court of last resort," leaving the primary 
responsibility to exercise jurisdiction over alleged criminals to individual states. One of 
the most important principles of the ICC is the complementarity principle, which 
according to Steven Roach, “allows for and validates international intervention when 
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states parties fail to investigate universally condemned international crimes…”115 Power 
and legitimization is taken away from the court is in the enforcement of verdicts.  The 
ICC can only render verdicts while the states are the actors that enforce the verdicts.   
 
The US and the Court have had what one could call a strained relationship.  Though the 
U.S. supported the idea of an international body that held the worst perpetrators 
responsible for their actions, they have not signed the treaty to become a member of the 
ICC.  It is quite ironic since the US has supported international law throughout history.  
They did so in part because the United States Republican Congress in the late ninety‟s 
and early 21
st
 century claimed that the ICC was a threat to US sovereignty.  The US 
sought certain exemptions in being held accountable for such things as military personnel 
during times of war and/or conflict.  In the early twenty first century, though the US 
requests of exemptions were denied, President Clinton signed the treaty, all the while 
knowing that Congress would not likely ratify the treaty.  The US Congress went so far 
as to pass anti-ICC legislation in 2002 stating that servicemen would not be prosecuted in 
the ICC.  In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the American Servicemembers' Protection 
Act (ASPA), which contained a number of provisions, including prohibitions on the U.S. 
providing military aid to countries which had ratified the treaty establishing the court 
(exceptions granted), and permitting the President to authorize military force to free any 
U.S. military personnel held by the court, leading opponents to dub it "The Hague 
Invasion Act."  The act was later modified to permit U.S. cooperation with the ICC when 
dealing with U.S. enemies. 
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According to realist perspectives, it would not be in the best interest of states to 
participate in international organizations such as the ICC, because the intentions of other 
states are never known.  Many states see the ICC as an invasion of their sovereignty even 
though as Falk notes, “the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is limited by the acceptance of 
the complementarity principle by which the ICC can only act if systems of national 
justice fail to indict and prosecute those alleged to be guilty of such crimes.”116 Realists 
would say that the ICC is doomed to failure due in part to the bias with which rulings by 
the ICC are enforced.  Since the ICC can only render verdicts, it depends on states to 
enforce them, and then, only those states that have ratified the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court can enforce its decisions.  
 
Another line of international relations thought, Liberalism, says that states are not 
necessarily the unitary actors in the world.  States follow a system of regimes (laws, 
norms, customs, etc) to maintain balance in the world and the ICC is one of those 
regimes.  States Parties are obliged to fully cooperate with the Court in its investigations 
and prosecution of crimes under the Statute.  To this end, States Parties should designate 
appropriate channels of communication with the Court, ensure that there are procedures 
available under their national law for all forms of cooperation and consultation with the 
Court whenever there are problems that could impede or prevent the execution of the 
Court's request for cooperation.  The jurisdiction of the ICC will be complementary to 
national courts, which means that the Court will only act when countries themselves are 
unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute. 
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The ICC's mission of promoting moral accountability in the international realm, calls 
attention the role that its legitimacy plays in promoting global order, in particular, the 
deterrent effect and the fostering of responsibility. Moral accountability refers to the 
innate responsibility of state leaders to protect their citizens from serious harm.  
According to Falk, the inception of the ICC itself “represents a great victory for the ethos 
of accountability, making those who abuse governmental power face the possibility of 
being held criminally accountable for their misdeeds as measured by accepted 
international standards relating to human rights, crimes against humanity, and 
international humanitarian law.”117  These leaps forward in creating a global court that 
administers law on global norms and values gives one insight into what may be to come 
on a larger scale. 
 
Though it remains a young court, the ICC offers a discursive space for promoting the 
principles of international criminal law.  By establishing a permanent venue within which 
judges, prosecutors, and other officials can assess and debate the merits of evidence 
(provided mainly by NGOs) of an international investigation, the ICC reflects an 
important context of the growing link between discourse and (human) security 
(deterrence).  In short, though the ICC is not able to overcome the problem posed by state 
sovereignty (state cooperation), it has been able to create a promising discursive space for 
promoting a legitimate international order.  
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Conclusion: Towards a Global Civil Society 
Qualifying Habermas’s Cosmopolitan Vision 
As stated earlier, the application of communicative action theory to international politics 
underscore the importance of examining the effects of reasoned argumentation in 
institutional decision-making processes. The emerging trend toward a global civil society 
is best understood in terms of these institutional contexts: namely international law and 
diplomacy.  Communicative action has shown to uphold the components of international 
relations that assert communication should be conducted for the betterment of the 
community as a whole, rather than for the aims of power politics.   
 
Lessons that can be learned from the earlier case studies of Kosovo and the Iraq War are 
important examples of why we need to create a global public sphere.  The global public 
sphere represents the space between the global community and states.  Perhaps if during 
the dialogue prior to the Kosovo conflict, states were able to use Intersubjectivity rather 
than preconceived prejudices and biases, the talk would have been more transparent.  
Milosevic could have perhaps seen that the ultimate goal of the international system was 
not to undermine Yugoslavia‟s sovereignty, but rather protect its citizens from ethnic 
tension then he might have been more cooperative.  Furthermore, if Saddam Hussein 
would have allowed for international law to run its course and allowed for greater 
transparency to show that he did not have weapons of mass destruction, then the US 
might not have declared war.  I do not want to spend my time speculating about 
possibilities of the past, however, by examining the break in communication or lack of 
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honest negotiation, we can see that disorder can be linked to the uncritical use of 
coercion, and that reasoned argumentation is needed to build trust and to reach mutual 
consensus on international issues.  
 
Over the course of this thesis, my aim was to demonstrate the implications of Habermas‟s 
cosmopolitan vision in hopes of leading toward a global civil society.  Habermas‟s 
cosmopolitan vision is inclusive of the state.  The state continues to plays a role in the 
international system, just not the sole powerful role that now exists.  I will examine 
Habermas‟s cosmopolitan vision to extrapolate the role of the state in the international 
system.  I have outlined how these core tenets of communicative action theory (lifeworld, 
legitimacy, and validity claims) can be used in the international system to bring together 
actors that seem to have little in common and give them the tools to communicate on a 
level that upholds reason in argumentation. 
 
By looking at the impact that communicative action has on the international system I 
have shown how actors can work together to argue their own position.  The utilization of 
communicative action in international relations can build a global civil society that 
postures reason and ration above power.  It is also possible for communicative action to 
exist within the existing anarchic system as a cosmopolitan society emerges. This allows 
for communicative rationality and consensus to be utilized immediately in order to bring 
peaceful outcomes to international conflicts. 
61 
 
Bibliography 
 
Burchill, Scott et al., eds. Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005. 
 
Claude, Inis L. Jr. “Collective Legitimization and the United Nations,” International 
Organization 20, no. 3 (Summer, 1966): 367-379. 
 
Coles, Romand. Political Science: State of the Discipline. Edited by Ira Katznelson and 
Helen V. Milner, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. 
 
Collard-Wexler, Simon.  “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European 
Union,” European Journal of International Relations, 12, no. 3 (2006) 397-432. 
 
Connolly, William E. Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 
London: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
 
Deitelhoff, Nicole and Harald Muller “Theoreticl paradise – empirically lost? Arguing 
with Habermas,” Review of International Studies, 31 (2005) 167-179. 
 
Dryzek, John S.  “Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy,” Political 
Theory 29, no. 5 (Oct., 2001): 651-669. 
 
Englebert, Pierre “Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic 
Development in Tropical Africa,” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (Mar., 
2000): 7-36. 
 
Etzioni, Amitai. From Empire to Community. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. 
 
Falk, Richard A. The Declining World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics. New 
York: Routledge, 2004. 
 
Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. Remapping Global Politics: History’s 
Revenge and Future Shock.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Gasper, De. The Ethics of Development. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004. 
 
Germain, Randall D. and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: international relations 
theory and the new Gramscians,” Review of International Studies. 24 (1998) 3-21. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms. Tr. William Rehg, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1996. 
 
62 
 
Habermas, Jürgen “Letter to America,” The Nation, December 16, 2002. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Divided West. Ed and tr. Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2004. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume I. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume II. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984. 
 
Hermann, Richard K., Thomas Risse & Marilynn B. Brewer. 2004. Transnational 
Identities: Becoming Europe in the EU. Landham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 
Inc. 
 
Hohendahl, Peter U. 1985. “The Dialectic of Enlightenment Revisited: Habermas‟ 
Critique of the Frankfurt School,” New German Critique.  35 (Special Issue on 
Jürgen Habermas) 3-26. 
 
Honneth, Axel and Hans Joas, eds. Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen 
Habermas’s Theory of communicative Action. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Horkheimer, Max. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. New York: Herder and Herder, 
1972. 
 
Horkheimer, Max. Eclipse of Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947. 
 
Ingram, David. 2003. “Between Political Liberalism and Postnational Cosmopolitanism: 
Toward an Alternative Theory of Human Rights,” Political Theory. 31(3) pp. 359-
391. 
 
James, Michael Rabinder. “Communicative Action, Strategic Action, and Inter-Group 
Dialogue,” European Journal of Political Theory, 2, no. 2 (April, 2003) 157-182. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. ed. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986. 
 
Linklater, Andrew. “Citizenship, Humanity, and Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions,” 
Inernational Political Science Review, 22, no. 3 (July, 2001) 261-277. 
 
Linklater, Andrew. “The Evolving Spheres of International Justice,” International 
Affairs, 75, no. 3 (July, 1999) 473-482. 
 
63 
 
Linklater, Andrew. “The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Implications for the 
Sociology of States-Systems,” International Affairs, 78, no 2 (April, 2002) 319-338. 
 
Linklater, Andrew. “The Transformation of Political Community: E.H. Carr, Critical 
Theory and International Relations,” Review of International Studies, 23, no. 3 (July, 
1997) 321-338.  
 
Marcuse, Herabert. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. 
 
Mearsheimer, John J.  “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power.” Art, Robert J. and Robert 
Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. New 
York: Pearson Education, 2007. 
 
Mitzen, Jennifer. “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations, 12, no. 3 (2006): 341-370. 
 
Mitzen, Jennifer. “Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global 
Public Spheres,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (August, 2005): 401-
417. 
 
Monroe, Kristen Renwick. “Human Nature, Identity, and the Search for a General Theory 
of Politics.” Contemporary Empirical Political Theory. Edited by Kristen Renwick 
Monroe. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. 
 
Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, American ed.  New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 
 
Rainbow, Paul and Nikolas Rose, eds. The Essential Foucault: Selections from the 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. New York: New York Press, 2003. 
 
Risse, Thomas. “Beyond Iraq: The Crisis f the Transatlantic Security Community,” 
Center for Transatlantic Foreign and Security Political Science. University of Berlin, 
German, June 24, 2003, 1-21 
 
Risse, Thomas. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, domestic 
Structures and International Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995. 
 
Risse, Thomas. “Let‟s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International 
Organizations 54, no. 1 (Winter, 2000) 1-39. 
 
Roach, Steven C. Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader. New York: 
Taylor and Francis Group, 2008. 
 
64 
 
Roach, Steven C. Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights and Globalization. Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005.  
 
Rosenfeld, Michel. “Habermas‟s Call for Cosmopolitan Constitutional Patriotism in an 
Age of Global Terror: A Pluralist Appraisal” Constellations 14, no. 2 (2007): 159-
181. 
 
Scheuerman, William E.  “Global Governance Without Global Government: Habermas 
on Postnational Democracy,” Political Theory 36, no. 1 (February 2008): 133-151. 
 
Stichweh, Rudolf. “Genesis of a Global Public Sphere,” Society for International 
Development 46, no. 1 (March 2003) 26-29. 
 
Taylor, Charles. Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth, “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics.” Art, Robert J. and Robert 
Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, New 
York, Pearson Education, 2007. 
 
Wendt, Alexander.  “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 
(Summer, 1995): 71-81. 
65 
 
 
 
End Notes 
  
                                                 
1
 Burchill, 6. 
2
 Burchill, 140. 
3
 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach. Remapping Global Politics: History’s 
Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2004), 39. 
4
 Ferguson, 41. 
5
 Ferguson, 41. 
6
 Robert Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1986), 208. 
7
 Kristen Renwick Monroe, “Human Nature, Identity, and the Search for a General 
Theory of Politics.” Contemporary Empirical Political Theory, ed. Kristen Renwick 
Monroe (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997), 147. 
8
 Germain, 7. 
9
 Steven Roach, ed., Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader (New York, 
Taylor and Francis Group, 2008), 197. 
10
 Risse, 2000, 1. 
11
 Risse, 2000, 2. 
12
 Risse, 2000, 4. 
13
 Risse, 2000, 9. 
14
 Risse, 2000, 4. 
15
 Jennifer Mitzen, “Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global 
Public Spheres.” American Political Science Review, 99, no. 3 (August 2005): 401-402. 
16
 Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Muller, “Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing 
with Habermas.” Review of International Studies, 31 (2005): 171 
17
 Deitelhoff, 173. 
18
 Andrew Linklater, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002. 
19
 Linklater, 2001, 254. 
20
 Linklater, 1999, 481. 
21
 Linklater, 1997, 337. 
22
 Linklater, 1997, 323. 
23
 Linklater, 2002, 334-335. 
24
 Linklater, 2002, 335. 
25
 Linklater, 2002, 334-335. 
26
 Linklater, 1999, 480. 
27
 Linklater, 1999, 481. 
28
 Habermas, 1984, VII, 131. 
29
 Habermas, 1984, VII, 119. 
30
 Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, eds, Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen 
Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991): 251. 
66 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
31
 Honneth, 262. 
32
 Habermas, 1984, VII, 131. 
33
 Habermas, 1984, VII, 131. 
34
 Habermas, VII, 1984, 56. 
35
 Roach, 2008, 197. 
36
 Claude, 368. 
37
 Habermas, 1996, 319. 
38
 Habermas, VI, 1984, x. 
39
 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action VII, tr. Thomas McCarthy 
(Boston, Beacon Press, 1984), 56. 
40
 Habermas, VII, 1984, 148. 
41
 Burchill, 172. 
42
 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” International 
Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring, 1999): 379. 
4343
 John S. Dryzek, “Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy.” Political 
Theory 29, no. 5 (Oct., 2001): 652. 
44
 Inis L. Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimization and the United Nations.” International 
Organization 20, no. 3 (Summer, 1966): 369. 
45
 Pierre Englebert, “Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic 
Development in Tropical Africa.” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (Mar., 2000): 
11. 
46
 Hohendahl, 1985, p. 21 
47
 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, tr. William Rehg, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1996), 26. 
48
 Habermas, 1996, 134. 
49
 Scheuerman, 141-142. 
50
 Habermas, 1996, 83. 
51
 David Ingram, “Between Political Liberalism and Postnational Cosmopolitanism,” 
Political Theory 31, no. 3 (2003), 360. 
52
 Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West, ed. & tr. Ciaran Cronin, (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2004), 120. 
53
 Jennifer Mitzen, 2005, “Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and 
Global Public Spheres”, American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (August, 2005), 
403. 
54
 Thomas Risse, 2000, “Let‟s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics”, 
International Organizations 54, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 9. 
55
 Habermas, 1984, VI, 17. 
56
 Habermas, 1984, VI, 99. 
57
 Habermas, 1984, VI, 101. 
58
 Ferguson, 154 
59
 Habermas, 1984, VI, 101. 
60
 James, 163. 
61
 Jürgen Habermas, VI, 1984, 86. 
67 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
62
 James, 161. 
63
 Habermas, 1984, VI, 18. 
64
 James, 159. 
65
 James, 160. 
66
 Michael Rabinder James, “Communicative Action, Strategic Action, and Inter-Group 
Dialogue,” European Journal of Political Theory 2, no. 2 (April 2003): 159. 
67
 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, MIT Press, 
1981), 23. 
68
 James, 160. 
69
 James, 164. 
70
 Honneth, 141. 
71
 Risse, 2000, 9. 
72
 James, 161. 
73
 Kenneth Waltz, “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics.” Art, Robert J. and Robert 
Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New 
York, Pearson Education, Inc., 2007) 
74
 John J. Mearsheimer, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power.” Art, Robert J. and Robert 
Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. (New 
York, Pearson Education, 2007) 
75
 Waltz, 2007. 
76
 Waltz, 2007 
77
 Waltz, 2007 
78
 Burchill, 16. 
79
 Keohane 
80
 Keohane, 196. 
81
 Burchill, 205. 
82
 William E. Scheuerman, “Global Governance Without Global Government,” Political 
Theory 36, no. 1 (February, 2008): 143, 
83
 Burchill, 12. 
84
 Pierre Englebert, “Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic 
Development in Tropical Africa.” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (Mar., 2000): 9. 
85
 Ferguson, 109. 
86
 Mitzen, 2005, 407. 
87
 Mitzen, 2005, 401-417. 
88
 Mitzen, 2005, 407. 
89
 Risse, 2000, 14. 
90
 Risse, 2000, 11. 
91
 Risse, 2000, 20. 
92
 Rudolf Stichweh, “The Genesis of a Global Public Sphere,” Society for International 
Development 46, no. 1 (March 2003): 27. 
93
 Richard A. Falk, The Declining World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics, (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 113. 
94
 Etzioni, 153. 
68 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
95
 The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1993, 268. 
96
 Steven C. Roach, Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights and Globalization, (Burlington, 
Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 85. 
97
 James, 166. 
98
 Stephen D. Krasner, “Power Politics and transnational relations,” in Bringing 
Transnational Relations Back In, Thomas Risse, ed. (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 278. 
99
 James, 166. 
100
 James, 166. 
101
 Roach, 2005, 91. 
102
 Jürgen Habermas, “Letter to America,” The Nation, 16 December 2002, 2. 
103
 President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, 
September 11, 2001. 
104
 Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community, (New York, Palgrave, 2004), 98. 
105
 Risse, 1995, 259. 
106
 Risse, 1995, 259,This section of the definition “builds upon…the original definition of 
transnational relations by encompassing both trans-societal and transgovernmental 
relations.” 
107
 Risse, 1995, 3. 
108
 Scheuerman, 138. 
109
 Mitzen, 405. 
110
 Richard K. Hermann et al, Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU 
(Landham, Rownam and Littlefield Publishing, 2004), 1. 
111
 Simon Collard-Wexler, “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European 
Union,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 407. 
112
 Collard-Wexler, 398. 
113
 Collard-Wexler, 409 
114
 Falk, 130. 
115
 Roach, 2005, 33. 
116
 Falk, 129. 
117
 Falk, 30. 
 
 
About the Author 
 
Kimberly Weaver was born in Walnut Creek Ohio.  She received her 
Bachelor of Science in International Business from the University of Akron 
and her Master of Arts in Political Science from the University of South 
Florida.  
 
